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PREFACE 
 
 
As part of President Bush’s Advanced Energy Initiative, the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership 
(GNEP) seeks to develop worldwide consensus on enabling expanded use of economical, 
carbon-free nuclear energy to meet the growing electricity demand. This will use a nuclear fuel 
cycle that enhances energy security, while promoting non-proliferation. It would achieve its goal 
by having nations with secure, advanced nuclear capabilities provide fuel services — fresh fuel 
and recovery of used fuel — to other nations that agree to employ nuclear energy for power 
generation purposes only. The closed fuel cycle model envisioned by this partnership requires 
development and deployment of technologies that enable recycling and consumption of long-
lived radioactive waste. In 2006, the Department of Energy (DOE) requested Argonne National 
Laboratory and its educational partners to perform an economic study regarding Poland 
becoming a potential GNEP partner. Poland represents a class of countries that presently have no 
installed nuclear power plants. This work was supported by the U.S. Department of Energy, 
Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy, Science, and Technology, under contract DE-AC02-
06CH11357. Volume I summarizes the results of this study. Volume II is a detailed appendix 
that describes the methodology, assumptions, and results of the economic models that were used 
for the study. 
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NOTATION 
 
 
The following is a list of the abbreviations, acronyms, and units of measure used in this 
document. (Some acronyms and abbreviations used only in tables may be defined only in those 
tables.) 
 
 
GENERAL ACRONYMS, ABBREVIATIONS, AND UNITS OF MEASURE 
 
AFBC Atmospheric fluidized bed combustion 
 
CEE Central and Eastern Europe 
CO2 Carbon dioxide 
 
DOE U.S. Department of Energy 
 
EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development  
EMA Electricity Market Agency  
EMCAS Electricity Market Complex Adaptive System 
EPR European Pressurized Water Reactor 
ESA Euratom Supply Agency 
EU European Union 
 
GHG Greenhouse gas 
GNEP Global Nuclear Energy Partnership 
 
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency 
IGCC Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle 
 
kgHM Kilograms of heavy metal 
kWh Kilowatt hour 
 
LCOE Levelized cost of electricity 
LMP Locational marginal price 
 
MMBtu Million British Thermal Units 
MW Megawatt 
MWe Megawatt electric 
MWh Megawatt hour 
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x 
NAEA National Atomic Energy Agency 
NGCC Natural Gas Combined Cycle 
 
O&M Operation and Maintenance 
 
PFBC Pressurized Fluidized Bed Combustion  
PSE Polskie Sieci Eectroenergetyczne (Polish Power Grid Company) 
 
R&D Research and Development 
 
VVER Russian type of pressurized water reactor 
 
WASP Wien Automatic System Planning Package 
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POLAND BECOMING A MEMBER OF THE GLOBAL 
NUCLEAR ENERGY PARTNERSHIP 
 
by 
 
V. Koritarov, G. Conzelmann, R.R. Cirillo, and S.M. Goldberg 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
Within a constrained carbon environment, the risks of future natural gas supply, 
and the need to move to market-based electricity prices, the study team found: 
(1) the deployment of new nuclear energy in Poland itself is very competitive in 
the next decade or two; (2) if such generation could be made available to Poland 
prior to deployment of its own nuclear generation facilities, Poland would benefit 
from partnering with its Baltic neighbors to import electricity derived from new 
nuclear generation facilities sited in Lithuania; and (3) Poland appears to be a 
good candidate for a partnership in the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership 
(GNEP) as an emerging nuclear energy country. 
 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
Development of carbon policies and the availability and price of natural gas will affect the 
competitiveness of nuclear energy in Poland. This concern is shared by the rest of the countries 
in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), particularly in the Baltic region. These countries have 
noted that Russia already has doubled the price of natural gas to the former Soviet republics.1 
 
 
STUDY FINDINGS 
 
Given a constrained carbon environment, the risks of future natural gas supplies, and the need to 
move to market-based electricity prices, the study found the following: (1) the deployment of 
new nuclear energy in Poland itself is very competitive in the next decade or two; (2) based on 
the results of the economic models, the initial plants will be competitive as early as the 2017 time 
                                                 
1 The international press is reporting that Poland is making two moves to reduce its reliance on Russian energy 
supplies for its electricity needs: (1) Poland’s state-owned electricity company, Polskie Sieci Elektroenergetyczne 
(PSE), will sign a deal with Lithuania’s Lietuvos Energija to link power grids; and (2) Polish Prime Minister 
Jaroslaw Kaczynski would like (a) a 25% ownership stake in any new nuclear capacity that is built in Lithuania, 
(b) to share that investment with its three other Baltic partners (Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia), and (c) to 
accelerate the schedule to have such capacity available by 2015.  
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frame, about four years earlier than the official Government timetable for new deployments 
within Poland; (3) nuclear energy’s share of the Polish electricity market could grow to as much 
as 40%; (4) as a first priority, the early plants should be sited in the northern sector of Poland, in 
the vicinity of Gdańsk, to address electricity shortfalls in that region; and (5) Poland would also 
benefit from diversity of electricity supply strategies, including the flexibility of importing 
electricity from Lithuania.2 
 
The four main economic drivers benefiting nuclear energy in Poland are:  
 
• The ~15% increase in the cost of coal-fired electricity as a result of 
implementation of the Kyoto Protocol; 
 
• The need to hedge any reliance on gas-fired electricity in light of the future 
supply and pricing policy of Poland’s major supplier, Gazprom; 
 
• The need for Poland to complete the transition to a market economy over the 
next decade to meet the conditions of its membership in the European Union 
(EU); and 
 
• The eligibility of nuclear power plant projects for concession loans 
(7% discount rate) from the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development because of the environmental, national security, and economic 
benefits of nuclear energy. 
 
Poland appears to have significant potential to be a partner in GNEP as an emerging nuclear 
energy country. It appears that nuclear fuel leasing would be the best fuel supply and disposition 
alternative — this was Poland’s arrangement of choice with MINATOM (Ministry of Atomic 
Energy of the former Soviet Union) when new nuclear energy was considered in the 1980s. 
 
Within the EU, all investment activities in the energy sector must be reviewed as part of a formal 
public acceptance process. Poland’s National Atomic Energy Agency has already conducted 
polling and has found increasing public acceptance. Polish authorities have stated that this public 
polling process will be completed within five years. 
 
 
APPLICATION OF THIS STUDY TO OTHER COUNTRIES 
 
The likelihood that other CEE countries that are members of the EU will be GNEP partners is 
equally high because of concerns about their natural gas supply situations and their need to move 
to a carbon-constrained economy. Such an arrangement, in the short term, could be implemented 
most expeditiously as a multinational nuclear energy project among the CEE countries, similar to 
the trans-Baltic project that is now under active consideration. 
 
                                                 
2 If the power bridge connection between Lithuania and Poland were available as early as 2015 and about 350 MWe 
were imported, Poland could utilize this additional capacity in this period to meet its projected demand needs. 
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The potential to deploy future nuclear plants and become a GNEP partner may also be significant 
for non-CEE countries, specifically, developing countries in Asia, Africa, and South America. 
As these countries improve their standards of living, their needs to diversify their supplies of 
energy will increase, and, due to likely financial constraints, the interest to develop a regional 
approach to nuclear deployment will grow as well. 
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FINDINGS 
 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) requested Argonne National Laboratory to analyze the 
potential of Poland being a member of GNEP. At present, DOE has underway three analyses 
covering “three very different potential nuclear consumer countries as GNEP partners:” 
(1) Poland, which currently has no installed nuclear power plant capacity; (2) a second country 
that has significant dependency on nuclear energy and plans for more deployments; and (3) a 
third country that has limited nuclear energy capacity and could relinquish its fuel enrichment 
capabilities. Argonne, partnering with students and faculty at the University of Chicago and 
Northwestern University, performed both scoping analysis and detailed modeling of the 
prospects of nuclear energy to serve the electricity requirements in Poland during the next 
several decades. This modeling provided detailed information on timing, size, and the potential 
region in Poland where new nuclear energy would have the largest benefits. Argonne and its 
partners also reviewed the societal and policy issues impacting Poland’s role as an emerging 
nuclear energy country. An emerging nuclear energy country would be dependent on nuclear fuel 
supply and disposition services from nuclear supplier countries.  
 
 
Poland’s Existing Dependence on Coal 
 
Poland depends heavily on its indigenous 
supply of coal and lignite for fuel to generate 
electricity (Figure 1). 
 
As a signer of the Kyoto Protocol, Poland has 
made the commitment by 2008–2012 to 
reduce its emissions of the three main 
greenhouse gases (GHGs) by 6% below the 
base year of 1998. For many countries, such 
as the European Union (EU) member states, 
this corresponds to some 15% below their 
expected GHG emissions in 2008 and for 
Annex II countries, a 10% reduction is 
required). These environmental constraints 
will have a major deleterious impact on 
deploying new coal-fired electricity in 
Poland, which does not sequester carbon. 
 
 
FIGURE 1  Poland Fuel Share of Energy 
Consumption (Quadrillion Btu) as of 2001 
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Therefore, to replace or expand its baseload capacity, Poland would need to consider the 
following alternatives: 
 
Significant Carbon Constraints: 
 
• Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle (IGCC) 
 
• Natural Gas Combined Cycle (NGCC) 
 
• Nuclear Energy 
 
Moderate Carbon Constraints: 
 
• Atmospheric Fluidized Bed Combustion (AFBC)3 
 
• Pressurized Fluidized Bed Combustion (PFBC)4 
 
 
Energy Policy 
 
The transformation of the energy sector in Poland is an ongoing process in terms of its 
restructuring, privatization, and deregulation. The relevant state priorities are: 
 
• EU integration; 
 
• Environmental considerations aimed at decreasing air pollutant emissions; 
 
• Fulfillment of international obligations; and 
 
• Reducing Poland’s dependence on foreign imports of oil and natural gas. 
 
The Government’s energy policy historically has been laid down in the Guidelines for Poland’s 
Energy Policy until the year 2020, adopted by the Council of Ministers in February 2000. The 
document formulated the strategic directions of the country’s activities, the central element of 
which includes “…promotion of modern, highly efficient power generators and equipment 
capable of competing both in national and foreign markets.” The rationalization policy consists 
of: 
 
• Improvement of fuel consumption efficiency, i.e., cogeneration promotion; 
                                                 
3 The higher thermal efficiencies of AFBC systems result in lower coal requirements when compared to current 
conventional pulverized coal steam plants. This results in lower emissions of greenhouse gases. 
4 PFBC systems can achieve higher thermal efficiencies than AFBC systems. The increased energy in the high 
pressure gases exiting the PFBC boiler can drive both a gas and steam turbine, known as a combined cycle 
system. Also, the higher thermal efficiencies of PFBC systems result in lower coal requirements when compared 
to current conventional pulverized coal steam plants. This also results in lower emissions of greenhouse gases. 
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• Rational heat and electricity consumption; and 
 
• Promotion of non-conventional and renewable energy sources. 
 
The Government has focused on three areas to promote Poland’s electricity strategy: 
 
• Direct regulations (standards), 
 
• Market stimulation (economic and fiscal), and 
 
• Supporting instruments (information, education, R&D). 
 
At the beginning of 2002, an Assessment of Implementation and Amendment to the 
Guidelines for Energy Policy of Poland until 2020 was approved by the Council of Ministers, 
containing, in particular, a new short-term forecast for the development of Poland’s economy, 
the fuel and energy sector, until 2005. 
 
 
Recent Pronouncements by the Current Government Impacting the Deployment of Nuclear 
Energy 
 
During the course of the study, the Minister of the Polish Economy informed the Assistant 
Secretary of Nuclear Energy that Poland is planning to introduce new nuclear energy in the 2021 
time frame. It would take about 15 years to finish the public review, investment, and construction 
process. This assessment was supported by a recent assessment done by Poland’s Energy Market 
Agency (EMA). 
 
After the study was completed, Poland’s Government has been reported to support importing 
nuclear generated electricity from Lithuania. Lithuania, in collaboration with other Baltic 
countries, is considering building up to 3,200 megawatt electric (MWe) of new nuclear capacity. 
The international press has reported that, in December 2006, in a move to reduce Poland’s 
reliance on Russian energy supplies for its electricity needs: (1) Poland’s state-owned electricity 
company, Polskie Sieci Elektroenergetyczne (PSE), will sign a deal with Lithuania’s Lietuvos 
Energija to link power grids; and (2) Polish Prime Minister Jaroslaw Kaczynski would like to (a) 
import about 350 MWe of nuclear energy using this power bridge, (b) share that investment with 
its three other Baltic partners (Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia), and (c) accelerate the schedule to 
have such capacity available by 2015. 
 
The study included an analysis of importing electricity from Lithuania as an alternative to siting 
new nuclear plants within Poland. This alternative was considered because of the strong interest 
exhibited by the PSE and Poland’s National Atomic Energy Agency (NAEA) for a trans-Baltic 
project.  
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FINDINGS OF THE STUDY 
 
 
Results of the Simplified Models 
 
The first set of models was used to assess the basic economic competitiveness of different 
generating technologies. 
 
 
1.  Screening Analysis 
 
This approach determines the generation costs as a function of the unit capacity factor. For the 
purpose of this analysis, the European Pressurized Water Reactor (EPR) was chosen as the 
candidate nuclear energy technology because of its level of interest in the EU.5 The results of the 
initial screening analysis show that the EPR unit is economically competitive for capacity factors 
of 80% or higher and a discount rate of 5% as compared with all fossil-based candidate 
technologies.6 This comparison was based on 2003 fuel prices.7 If a $15/ton CO2 emission 
allowance cost is borne by the fossil-based candidates, the EPR unit is economically competitive 
for capacity factors of 55% or higher at the same discount rate. Assuming 2021 fuel prices8 and 
the $15/ton CO2 cost, the EPR unit is economically competitive for a 40% or higher capacity 
factor at the same discount rate. 
 
 
2.  Pre-Tax Levelized Cost of Electricity (LCOE) Analysis 
 
The study team developed a simplified model for determining four of the components (i.e., 
annualized capital costs, fixed O&M costs, variable O&M costs, and fuel costs) for a detailed 
pre-tax Levelized Cost of Electricity (LCOE) calculation.9 It did not consider such items as the 
tax treatment of interest payments, depreciation, and other accrual expenses. The 2015 time 
frame was used for the financial analysis to support a potential 2021 in-service date. The results 
of the pre-tax LCOE analysis were calculated based on three discount rates, which are shown in 
Table 1. 
                                                 
5 The EPR was selected as the candidate nuclear plant because of the interest in that design in the European Union. 
(e.g., a 1500 MW unit is currently being built at the Olkiluoto site in Finland) and being considered actively in 
Italy and other EU countries. 
6 Usually the capital-intensive technologies, such as nuclear energy technology, are the most economical at high 
utilization levels. 
7 The nuclear fuel costs typically represent 12–15% of the total cost of electricity produced by nuclear plants. Since 
uranium ore has to be processed and enriched in order to be used as nuclear fuel, the cost of uranium typically 
accounts for only a small fraction of the total cost of producing electricity from nuclear power plants. Therefore, 
even a large increase in the uranium price has a relatively small effect on the nuclear electricity production costs. 
8 According to the Polish Energy Market Agency (EMA) analysis, 2021 is the anticipated in-service date for first 
nuclear plants in Poland. 
9 See Appendix 4 for detailed explanation of the methodology used to calculate the LCOE for base load power. 
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TABLE 1  Pre-Tax LCOE Based on 2015 Fuel Prices (in constant 2003 US $/MWh) 
  EPR PC  IGCC PFBC PC  AFBC NGCC10 
Discount 
Rate (%) 
Nuclear 
(1500 MW) 
Coal 
(400 MW) 
Coal 
(300 MW) 
Coal 
(150 MW) 
Lignite 
(500 MW) 
Lignite 
(150 MW) 
Nat. Gas 
(300 MW) 
        
5 29.74 31.40 37.89 34.41 31.49 29.32 37.21 
8 37.04 35.69 43.65 39.28 36.34 33.48 39.04 
10 42.29 38.77 47.80 42.78 39.82 36.48 40.08 
 
 
The main impact of fuel prices in 2015 is seen on the levelized cost of the natural gas combined 
cycle (NGCC) candidate, which is relatively high because of a modest escalation of natural gas 
prices. For a 5% discount rate, the EPR nuclear and AFBC lignite-fired candidate technologies 
are the lowest-cost options, with levelized costs of $29.74/MWh and $29.32/MWh, respectively. 
The nuclear candidate is sensitive to higher discount rate values; its LCOE increases to 
$42.29/MWh at a 10% discount rate. The LCOEs of integrated gasification combined cycle 
(IGCC) and pressurized fluidized bed combustion (PFBC) candidates are the highest-cost 
options for all three discount rates. 
 
If the CO2 emission allowance costs are taken into account, the competitiveness of the EPR 
nuclear technology improves markedly. The EPR becomes the preferred choice for even a 
relatively high 10% discount rate. The results of the pre-tax LCOE analysis are shown in Table 2 
for CO2 costs at $10/ton and in Table 3 for CO2 costs at $15/ton. 
 
 
TABLE 2  Pre-Tax LCOE Based on 2015 Fuel Prices and CO2 Cost of $10/ton11 (in constant 
2003 US $/MWh) 
  EPR PC IGCC PFBC PC AFBC NGCC 
Discount 
Rate (%) 
Nuclear 
(1500 MW) 
Coal 
(400 MW) 
Coal 
(300 MW) 
Coal 
(150 MW) 
Lignite 
(500 MW) 
Lignite 
(150 MW) 
Nat. Gas 
(300 MW) 
   
5 29.74 38.32 44.50 41.33 41.85 39.63 40.69 
8 37.04 42.61 50.26 46.20 46.70 43.79 42.52 
10 42.29 45.69 54.41 49.70 50.18 46.79 43.56 
 
                                                 
10 The study team used the 2005 World Energy Outlook to determine the projected price of natural gas; it is 
expected to rise to $5.20–5.60 per million British Thermal Units (MMBtu) in the 2020–2030 time frame (or 
about 25% above the current prices); if geopolitical tensions rise between Russia and its Central and Eastern 
European customers, natural gas prices could rise more significantly, such prices for natural gas would make 
NGCCs economically uncompetitive. 
11 The LCOE analysis included three scenarios for carbon: no tax, a $10/ton charge, and a $15/ton charge. 
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TABLE 3  Pre-Tax LCOE Based on 2015 Fuel Prices and CO2 Cost of $15/ton12 (in constant 
2003 US $/MWh) 
  EPR PC IGCC PFBC PC AFBC NGCC 
Discount 
Rate (%) 
Nuclear 
(1500 MW) 
Coal 
(400 MW) 
Coal 
(300 MW) 
Coal 
(150 MW) 
Lignite 
(500 MW) 
Lignite 
(150 MW) 
Nat. Gas 
(300 MW) 
   
5 29.74 41.78 47.81 44.79 47.03 44.79 42.43 
8 37.04 46.07 53.57 49.66 51.88 48.95 44.26 
10 42.29 49.15 57.72 53.16 55.36 51.95 45.30 
 
 
Both the screening and simplified financial levelized cost analyses demonstrate that new nuclear 
energy, using proven technology and with moderately escalating fuel prices and potential carbon 
taxes, would be economically competitive in Poland. 
 
 
Results of the Advanced Models 
 
The objective of Argonne’s grid analysis was to evaluate a candidate nuclear unit within the 
system in which it will operate. The objective was to ascertain appropriate sizing, timing, and 
location requirements. This analysis was carried out using the Wien Automatic System Planning 
Package (WASP) and the Electricity Market Complex Adaptive System (EMCAS) computer 
models to simulate both the present and future operation of the Polish electric power system in 
an interconnected and restructured environment.13 The study team used a 7% discount rate 
(based on published concession rates and the assumption that a moderate risk profile will exist in 
the financial markets at the time of deployment of new energy technology in Poland over the 
next decade or two), a $10/ton carbon price (based on implementation of Annex I of the Kyoto 
Protocol), and the EPR nuclear plant capacity of 1,500 MWe (note: an additional case was run 
for 1,000 MWe). This grid analysis utilized as inputs: 
 
• The existing system capacity, 
 
• System reliability requirements, 
 
• Dispatch factors for generating units (e.g., minimum load and spinning 
reserve requirements), and 
 
• Dynamic factors changing over plant’s lifetime (e.g., load growth and 
economic trends). 
 
                                                 
12 The LCOE analysis included three scenarios for carbon: no tax, a $10/ton charge, and a $15/ton charge. 
13 The models evaluate different technologies based on economics. Manpower and other infrastructure requirements 
needed to implement the least-cost expansion plan are assumed to be analyzed in subsequent studies. 
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1.  Projected Electricity Supply and Demand 
 
The analysis used EMA official projections of electricity consumption and load forecasts, shown 
in Figures 2 and 3.14 
 
 
FIGURE 2  Load Forecast 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3  Load and Capacity Balance 
                                                 
14 The load forecast was provided by the Polish Energy Market Agency. The growth in load is driven by the 
underlying assumptions regarding macroeconomic drivers. 
Volume 1 12 
 
2.  Results of the WASP Model 
 
The model projected the appropriate mix of electricity generation covering the study period 
(2016–2030) for four cases: 
 
• Base Case — 7% discount rate; $10/ton carbon tax; 1,500 MWe EPR 
Deployment 
 
• Smaller Unit Case — 7% discount rate; $10/ton carbon tax; 1,000 MWe 
Nuclear Energy Deployment15 
 
• High Discount Rate Case — 12% discount rate; $10/ton carbon tax; 1,500 
MWe EPR Deployment 
 
• Zero Carbon Tax Case — 7% discount rate; zero carbon tax; 1,500 MWe EPR 
Deployment 
 
Figures 4 through 11 show the results of the model for two years of the study period: 2017 (the 
starting date when new nuclear capacity is projected to be economically viable for the base case) 
and 2030 (the end of the study period). 
 
The study team found that a smaller-sized nuclear reactor (i.e., the 1000 MWe alternative case) 
has a slightly higher overnight cost than the EPR, but the savings in dispatching smaller units of 
base load power in the Polish grid more than counterbalances any overnight cost increases. The 
study team judged that significantly smaller reactors (for example,  
100–500 MWe) would not be economically competitive because the significantly higher 
overnight costs for those smaller reactors would dominate the WASP calculation.  
 
The four main economic drivers benefiting the deployment of new nuclear energy in the 2017 
time frame are:  
 
• Need for Poland to finalize transition to a market economy over the next 
decade to meet the conditions of its membership in the EU; 
 
• Increased cost of coal-fired electricity of about 15% as a result of 
implementation of the Kyoto Protocol; 
 
• Need to hedge any reliance on gas-fired electricity in light of the future supply 
and pricing policy of its major supplier, Gazprom; and 
 
• Eligibility for concession loans (7% discount rate) from the European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) because of its environmental, 
national security, and economic benefits. 
                                                 
15 Using a smaller nuclear plant capacity (1,000 MWe vs. 1,500 MWe) results in deploying new nuclear capacity a 
year earlier than the base case (i.e., 2016); based on the WASP analysis. 
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Poland is considering a scenario of importing nuclear-generated electricity from Lithuania. If the 
power bridge connection between Lithuania and Poland were available as early as 2015 and 
about 350 MWe were available, Poland could utilize this additional capacity in this period to 
meet its projected demand needs. 
 
 
3.  Results of the EMCAS Model 
 
The EMCAS model was developed at Argonne to analyze power systems that are in various 
stages of restructuring and deregulation. EMCAS employs an agent-based modeling approach 
and can been used as an “electronic laboratory” to probe the possible operational and economic 
impacts on the power system of various events. Market participants are represented as “agents” 
with their own set of objectives, decision-making rules, and behavioral patterns. Agents are 
modeled as independent entities that make decisions and take actions using limited and/or 
uncertain information available to them, similar to how organizations and individuals operate in 
the real world. EMCAS includes all the entities typically participating in power markets. 
 
EMCAS was configured to model the Polish power grid as a set of interconnected regions or 
market hubs with interconnections to neighboring systems and countries. As shown in Figure 12, 
there are a total of five regions or zones within Poland (Northern, Western, Central, Eastern, and 
Southern), as well as 12 zones representing other Central European countries/regions. Each zone 
represents an area with corresponding electricity generation and demand, and is represented as a 
node in the EMCAS network. The links that connect nodes with other nodes represent the 
aggregate power transfer capabilities among the regions. The model was run for 2017 – the year 
that the WASP system expansion analysis determined as the online year for the first new nuclear 
units. Given the supply and demand situation, and the generation costs in each of the zones, the 
EMCAS model estimated zonal generations, power transfers across zones, and locational 
marginal prices (LMP) at each of the nodes that can be taken as a proxy for the economic strain 
on the grid. The results were used to identify the location in this grid configuration for the first 
nuclear units that would provide the largest benefit to the Polish system. Benefits were measured 
in terms of changes in average zonal LMPs in December 2017 with and without nuclear. 
 
The study found that the early plants should be sited in the Northern Region of the country in the 
vicinity of Gdańsk19 (benefits of $66.12/MWh) or in the Western Region of the country in the 
vicinity of Poznań20 (benefits of $65.82/MWh) to address the shortage of generating capacity in 
those regions in Poland (Figure 13). The team also found that importing nuclear power from 
Lithuania would provide some economic relief (benefits of $15.54/MWh) (Figure 14). 
 
                                                 
19 Based on information obtained by the study team, no grid reinforcements would be needed for this site. 
20 The international press has reported that sites under consideration for a new nuclear plant include Gryfino and 
Klempicz near Poznań. 
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Legend:
Transmission Nodes
Thermal Units
Hydro Units
Non-Dispatchable Units
New interconnection
 
FIGURE 12  EMCAS Modeling Representation of the Polish Power Grid and Interconnections with 
Neighboring Systems 
 
 
Base Case: No nuclear plants in the system in 2017 
 
Alternative Cases: A total of 6 alternative cases were carried out assuming the location of new 
nuclear power plant in different zones/regions in Poland (North, West, Central, East, South) and 
in Lithuania. For the scenario analyzing possible location in Lithuania, it was also assumed that 
new 400-kV transmission line will be also constructed and in operation by 2017. The power 
transfer capability of this new transmission link, assuming a 2-circuit line, was estimated at 
2,000 MW. 
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FIGURE 13  Potential Sites for New Nuclear Plants in Poland 
 
 
POLAND’S NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE 
 
 
History of Nuclear Power in Poland 
 
In 1974, Poland (at that time the Polish People’s Republic) signed an agreement with the Soviet 
Union on co-operation in the field of nuclear power. For the first Polish nuclear power plant, four 
VVER-440/213 units based almost entirely on the Soviet Union supplying the reactor and 
nuclear fuel on a turn-key basis were chosen as the preferred arrangement. The Soviet Ministry 
of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) would have been the supplier of fuel services on a subsidized 
fee basis to promote new nuclear energy for their Eastern Bloc clients. However, the construction 
of the plant was abandoned in 1990. If Poland resumes its nuclear energy program, the country 
would prefer such a turn-key arrangement.21 
                                                 
21 This observation was based on interviews with project participants. 
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FIGURE 14  Change in LMP Pricing Based on Location of New Nuclear Plant (December 2017) 
 
 
Considerations for Poland 
 
1. EU Issues — Specific Market Restrictions: As a member of the EU, Poland would now 
operate under the Euratom Treaty. The treaty provides a common supply policy on the 
nuclear fuel cycle, including trade policies on accessibility of supply sources. The Euratom 
Supply Agency (ESA) is responsible for the secure supply of nuclear fuel within the EU. The 
ESA has had a supply quota for non-EU origin nuclear fuel. This quota issue would have to 
be addressed if Poland were to accept nuclear fuel provided by a U.S. or Russian fuel 
supplier or provider.22 
 
2. Contracting Issues — Need to Address both the Supply and Disposition of Nuclear Fuel: 
Poland will likely rely on the international nuclear fuel supply market and will likely want a 
contract with the fuel suppliers to remove the spent fuel in a timely manner. A “Supplier 
State” such as the U.S., Russia, or France, and a “Recipient State” such as Poland would 
negotiate bilaterally the terms and conditions of a fuel supply contract including its duration, 
the quantities of fresh fuel and spent fuel involved, the pricing mechanism, and the relevant 
fuel performance guarantees. The supply contract would have two components: delivery of 
fresh fuel23 and spent fuel.24 
                                                 
22 Since 1991, the ESA has controlled the uranium fuel supply market based on Article 81 of the Euratom Treaty. 
The policy is intended to assure diversification and security of supply and to protect the European enrichment 
industry (Areva and Urenco). Together, these two European enrichers have a EU market share of about 80% and 
Russia has the remaining 20%. 
23 The fuel would be leased to the owner of the nuclear plant in the recipient state — the supplier remaining the 
owner of the nuclear fuel and spent fuel at any point in time. 
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3. Fuel Supply Guarantees — Protection Against Supply Interruptions: A small country such as 
Poland is likely to need nuclear fuel supply assurances extending beyond usual contractual 
arrangements, e.g., concern that the necessary export licenses would not be granted for 
political reasons. Poland may have to rely on additional guarantees granted by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and/or an international fuel bank. The fuel 
bank could be created by having the uranium, conversion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication 
producers reserve a specified percentage of their production capacity for the IAEA. One of 
the mechanisms could be so-called “drawing rights” that would be exercised by the IAEA if, 
and only if, the suppliers fail to meet its contractual obligations and no other commercial fuel 
supplier is readily available. 
 
 
PUBLIC POLICY AND FINANCIAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR POLAND 
 
The Polish Ministry of the Economy estimates that the investment process in Poland for new 
nuclear energy will take ten years and the formal public acceptance process for nuclear power 
generation will take five years. The study group has observed the following favorable trends: 
 
• Within the EU, all investment activities in the energy sector require a formal 
public acceptance process. These include transmission lines, oil or gas 
pipelines, wind farms, and nuclear projects. The directive on the assessment of 
environmental impacts states that the investor must submit appropriate 
information to the “concerned public” and enable the communities involved to 
express their opinions on the proposed project prior to the start of its 
implementation. According to a 2004 Polish poll, a countrywide majority 
favored new nuclear energy. 
 
• The EBRD and the World Bank have already financed a total of eight 
significant energy projects in Poland and might be significant funding sources 
for new nuclear energy in Poland, particularly in a constrained carbon 
environment. 
 
 
APPLICABILITY OF THE RESULTS TO OTHER POTENTIAL PARTNERS 
 
The favorable results to deploy new nuclear energy in Poland and, therefore, to become a 
potential GNEP partner could be extrapolated to countries that possess: 
 
• Carbon-constraint market policies, 
 
• Availability of concession loans for new nuclear deployment, 
                                                                                                                                                             
24 As part of normal commerce for a fuel supply contract, spent fuel would be returned to the supplier after a 
minimum cooling time. For each kilowatt hour (kWh) produced by the plant, a specified amount of money (mills 
per kWh) would have to be paid by the plant owners to the supplier to cover all transportation, storage, 
conditioning, and final disposal costs of the spent fuel. 
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• Rising energy security concerns, and 
 
• Favorable public acceptance of nuclear energy. 
 
A growing number of countries worldwide already exhibit these attributes (see below). 
 
Central and Eastern European (CEE) Countries and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 
countries in Asia not only exhibit these attributes, but have also shown a historical willingness to 
become emerging nuclear energy countries; therefore, these countries might be prime partners 
with nuclear fuel supplier countries.  
 
• It has been reported that Kazakhstan and Ukraine will consider joint nuclear 
energy projects. Kazakh Prime Minister Danial Akhmetov and Ukrainian 
Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych signed a joint statement giving the 
go-ahead for the participation of Ukrainian companies in projects to construct 
nuclear power plants in Kazakhstan. The Kazakh authorities are considering 
building a nuclear power plant with two or three small reactors (≤ 300 MWe). 
Russia and Kazakhstan have established their first joint venture to enrich 
uranium, in the Siberian city of Angarsk near Irkutsk. The countries’ 
presidents agreed that Kazakhstan would contribute to initiatives on forming 
international centers providing nuclear fuel cycle services in Russia. 
 
• Additional nuclear capacity is being considered in the CEE region. 
 
As these countries are striving to improve their standards of living, their need to further diversify 
their supplies of energy will increase, particularly if geopolitical concerns increase between 
Russia and its CEE partners. Public acceptance of either new or additional nuclear energy within 
these countries and their interest in becoming emerging nuclear energy countries would have to 
be further investigated. 
 
Similarly, the methodology that was applied in this study can easily be adapted and applied to 
countries with plans for new nuclear power in Asia, Africa, and South America. The study team 
found that the environmental and pricing assumptions as well as implementation of the WASP 
and EMCAS modeling approach are very adaptable to these countries. Key assumptions such as 
each country’s economic growth projections, energy demand forecasts, environmental policies, 
potential oil and gas price shocks, as well as any overdependence on a single energy resource 
would have to be analyzed. Smaller-sized nuclear reactors as well as regional partnerships may 
be appropriate for countries that have very limited infrastructures to support new nuclear 
technology. 
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